Why don't Erdogan and Öcalan want an independent mediator?

According to KurdPress, the peace process between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which entered a new phase in late 2024, despite political and legal progress, continues to suffer from the lack of an independent mediator and credible mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the commitments of both parties. The statistical publication believes that this gap may become the most important weakness of the current process; because unlike the 2013 negotiations, this time there is no recognized international mediator from the United Nations, the European Union or the Norwegian government to monitor the process and hold the parties accountable.

In August 2026, the Turkish parliament approved the legal framework for the conditional disarmament and reintegration of former PKK members into society, and government institutions have also formed committees to follow up on its implementation.In September of the same year, it was reported that Abdullah Öcalan would join the committee to review the process of laying down arms, a move that did not mean his release from prison. These developments indicate that the peace process has moved beyond the stage of declaring positions and entering the stage of implementing specific measures, but an independent mechanism to assess the adherence of both parties to their commitments has not yet been established.

One of the main obstacles is the difference in the definition of the issue and the ultimate goal of the negotiations. The Turkish government deliberately uses the term “Turkey free of terrorism” rather than the Kurdish-Turkish peace process, a choice that shows that Ankara sees the issue primarily as a security challenge. From this perspective, the main goal is to dismantle the PKK, disarm its members and pave the way for their return to normal life.But for a large part of Kurdish society, as well as Öcalan, the issue is not limited to the fate of an armed organization, but also includes issues such as Kurdish political participation, linguistic rights, equal citizenship, local democracy, Kurdish identity, the rule of law, and constitutional reform. Consequently, disarmament may be the ultimate goal for the government, but for the Kurds it is only the first step on the path to resolving a political and historical conflict.

Ankara’s refusal to accept an international mediator is largely related to its concern about the internationalization of the Kurdish issue. The Turkish government does not want the presence of a foreign organization or government to create the impression that Ankara is negotiating with an independent political entity, rather than resolving an internal issue. Moreover, the presence of the PKKThe PKK’s designation as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union creates legal and political constraints on direct contact between some foreign institutions and governments.

However, the lack of a mediator cannot be explained solely by sovereign and legal considerations. An independent observer could ask both sides to explain the terms of the agreement, the timeline for implementing the commitments, and the consequences of violating it. What institution will certify the PKK’s disarmament? What guarantees are there that former members of the party will not face new prosecutions after laying down their weapons? What institution will evaluate the government’s implementation of political and legal reforms? What mechanism will be in place to resolve the dispute if Kurdish politicians are imprisoned again or if the Turkish government claims that full disarmament has not been achieved? On the other hand, if the PKKIf the UN concludes that Ankara has not kept its promises on reforms, what institution can demand that the government fulfill its commitments? The lack of clear answers to these questions has made mutual trust one of the most vulnerable parts of the peace process.

The experience of the failure of the previous process in 2015 also illustrates the importance of this issue. The collapse of the talks and the resumption of large-scale fighting proved that without institutional guarantees, political openness can quickly disappear. The PKK and its political allies fear that if they lay down their arms first, the Turkish government will no longer have the incentive to implement reforms. In contrast, Ankara fears that it will not be able to guarantee an end to armed activity if it grants political and legal concessions before ensuring the PKK’s disbandment.This is the fundamental problem of peace negotiations: each side wants to be sure of the other’s commitment before fulfilling its obligations. Independent guarantees can break this cycle of distrust and allow the parties to trust the implementation mechanism of the agreement, rather than relying solely on each other’s intentions.

The position of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Öcalan in the current structure is also part of this equation. By maintaining government control over the process, Erdogan can keep the agenda within Ankara’s desired security and political framework; Öcalan, through his influence in the Kurdish movement and his February 2025 call for the disarmament and disarmament of the PKK, has become a central player in the negotiations. The introduction of an independent mediator may limit the authority of either side in managing the process.However, it cannot be concluded from this that either Erdogan or Öcalan have officially opposed mediation; the point is that the current structure allows both to have greater control over the negotiations.

The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party, known as the Democrat Party, plays the role of a political mediator in this regard, but it cannot replace the independent mediator and guarantor of the agreement. It is itself a political actor in the process, with specific interests, demands, and electoral bases. Therefore, its ability to convey messages and facilitate negotiations is different from its independent authority to verify disarmament, monitor the implementation of government commitments, or address violations of the agreement. The current structure can be seen as a triangle of Erdogan, Öcalan, and the Democrat Party, in which there is a political mediator but no independent guarantor.Statistically, the solution is not necessarily to hand over the peace process to a foreign government, but to create a structure for independent oversight while maintaining domestic accountability and ownership. A parliamentary mechanism in Turkey could work with a credible body for oversight and verification; European legal institutions could scrutinize the implementation of human rights and rule of law commitments; and civil society and Kurdish parties should play a meaningful role in assessing the process. Likewise, the rights of victims and their families should not be ignored in the process of reaching an agreement, and the government should not be the sole authority to determine whether all commitments have been met.

Sustainable peace in Turkey simply means disarmament and the dissolution of the PKK.It is not a question of the PKK; rather, it requires a situation in which Kurdish citizens are not forced to choose between Kurdish identity and Turkish citizenship in order to preserve their identity, and in which their political participation is a normal part of democratic life, rather than a security issue. From this perspective, the main challenge of the current process is not just to end the armed struggle, but to transform political commitments into sustainable guarantees. Without independent monitoring and accountability mechanisms, there is a risk that the peace process will remain limited to the disarmament of the PKK, and that the political and legal demands of the Kurds will remain unresolved.