History of US sanctions and restrictions against the Kurds

According to KurdPress, US relations with Kurdish movements and figures over the past six decades have been a combination of military and intelligence cooperation, political restrictions, immigration considerations, financial sanctions and pursuing charges related to economic activities. Some published US government documents show that Washington has taken different approaches towards Kurdish leaders and groups at different times, depending on developments in Iraq, its relations with regional countries and regional security priorities.One of the most recent high-profile cases in this regard is the April 2026 lawsuit filed by the US Department of Justice to seize a Beverly Hills mansion. The US government alleges that the property was purchased and renovated with part of the proceeds of a corruption scheme related to US military fuel contracts, bribes to a senior Peshmerga official, and money transferred through private financial structures. According to the US government’s complaint, the contracts in question were worth more than $700 million between 2016 and 2020, and about $30 million of the funds attributed to the scheme were spent on the purchase and renovation of the property.

The case is significant because the allegations are not limited to media reports or political assessments, but are being pursued as part of a formal legal action by the US government.However, the asset forfeiture complaint does not constitute a criminal conviction or final conviction of the individuals named. As a result, the case can now be viewed as part of the record of U.S. judicial and financial actions related to the Kurdistan Region, not as definitive evidence of a crime by a Kurdish official or political party.

The Beverly Hills Mansion case also demonstrates that security and military cooperation between the United States and Kurdish forces does not preclude the pursuit of potential charges related to government contracts. The investigation into the case was conducted in partnership with the FBI, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Unit. However, the final status of the case and the outcome of the judicial proceedings will have to be assessed in light of new court documents.The public court records page that was accessible in this review is currently updated to June 11, 2026, and official federal court records must be reviewed to confirm further developments.

In addition to this new case, there is a history of official US sanctions against a number of Kurdish movements and figures. The most important example is the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which the US State Department placed on its list of foreign terrorist organizations on October 8, 1997. It has also been designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization since 2001 under Executive Order 13224. These decisions have imposed restrictions on material support, financial transactions, and activities of persons subject to US jurisdiction.

In February 2009, the US Treasury Department also sanctioned another Kurdish group under Executive Order 13224.In its official explanation for the decision, Washington claimed that the party was controlled by Kongra Gal, a name also used in US documents for the PKK. This action may be distinguished from placing an organization on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations because the Treasury’s decision was made through a different legal process.

In 2009 and 2011, the US Treasury Department also sanctioned a number of PKK and Kongra Gal leaders under the Counter-Smuggling Act. Murat Karayalın, Alireza Altun and Zubair Aydar were added to the list in October 2009. Cemil Bayk, Duran Kalkan, Ramzi Kartal, Sabri Ok and Adam Ozon were also sanctioned in April 2011. The Treasury Department alleged that the organization’s network in Europe was involved in smuggling and used the proceeds to procure weapons and equipment.In February 2012, Zeynep Güleri, Çerkez Akbulut, and Ömer Boztepe were also sanctioned under the same legal framework. The Treasury Department also targeted Ömer Güleri and three Romanian-based companies for their connections to the network. In these cases, assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction were frozen and U.S. persons were prohibited from conducting financial or business transactions with the designated individuals and entities. However, the direct basis for these decisions was the Anti-Smuggling Act; therefore, not all of them can necessarily be considered purely anti-terrorism sanctions. Also, the charges announced by the Treasury Department must be distinguished from independent judicial convictions.

The documents reviewed do not indicate that the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan were included on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations.Even the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act, passed on December 19, 2014, contained a specific provision for these two parties that amended their status under the immigration barriers related to terrorist organizations. The law exempted the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from the definition of Tier 3 terrorist organizations for the specific purpose of that provision and provided exemptions for some of their eligible members.

The existence of such a provision suggests that the issue of affiliation with Kurdish parties could be raised in U.S. immigration reviews even if the party itself was not on the list of foreign terrorist organizations. However, this legal precedent alone does not prove that Massoud Barzani or Jalal Talabani personally faced visa denials or entry bans.Historical State Department documents trace the origins of these political restrictions back to the 1960s. In a telegram dated April 5, 1963, the State Department stated that Washington did not want to intervene directly in the dispute between the Iraqi government and the Kurds and that it had received a message from Mustafa Barzani through Jalal Talabani. The archival explanation of the document states that a US official, in response to an earlier request, had said that US officials could not meet with Mustafa Barzani. The document is an example of the restrictions on political contact and Washington’s concern about the consequences of intervening in Iraq’s internal conflict, but it is not evidence that Mustafa Barzani was barred from entering the United States.According to another document, in February 1975, Peter Rodman, a staffer at the US National Security Council, wrote to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that Mustafa Barzani had requested a personal visit to Washington to present a request for more military assistance. William Colby, then-Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, had opposed the visit, as its main purpose was considered to be a request for more assistance and there were security concerns. Instead, it was suggested that a representative from Mustafa Barzani be sent to Washington.

However, the US government approved Mustafa Barzani’s medical trip a few months later. A National Security Council memo dated July 24, 1975 shows that Iran had asked its intelligence service to coordinate with the CIA for Mustafa Barzani’s medical treatment.The CIA approved the trip, writing in its assessment that preventing it would anger Mustafa Barzani and increase the likelihood of revealing covert U.S. support for the Kurds.

In April 1976, the U.S. State Department again considered issuing a visa to Mustafa Barzani. U.S. officials were concerned that his medical trip would turn into a long stay in the United States, which would affect Washington’s relations with Baghdad. Despite these concerns, the State Department recommended the visa, and a telegram of May 3, 1976 authorized its issuance. In August of that year, a separate memo examined Mustafa Barzani’s desire to remain in the United States permanently, emphasizing that the initial purpose of the trip was limited to medical treatment.These documents are a clear example of the influence of political calculations on travel and residence decisions, but they do not in themselves prove that a deportation order was issued or that his formal application for permanent residence was denied.

In the case of Jalal Talabani, a contemporaneous report in the Washington Post in August 1990 reported that he was in Washington to assess the level of support the George H.W. Bush administration provided for the opposition to Saddam Hussein. In the report, Jalal Talabani stated that he had not requested a meeting with the State Department; however, a State Department official stated that the administration would not meet with him. This is an example of a political refusal to meet with a Kurdish leader at a specific time, not evidence of an entry ban or visa denial.

Massoud Barzani went to the White House on July 31, 1992, and met with senior officials of the George H.W. Bush administration.Bruce Riedel, a former US National Security Council official, documented the meeting in a 2017 article for the Brookings Institution. In the same account, Riedel notes Massoud Barzani’s doubts about Washington’s intentions and the US officials’ emphasis on preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity. While this precedent is not consistent with the claim of a permanent ban on Massoud Barzani from entering the US, it does not alone rule out the possibility of temporary obstacles at other times.

In addition to individual cases and sanctions, official US State Department reports on the investment environment and corruption in Iraq are also important for understanding Washington’s concerns. The Iraq Investment Climate Report 2024 highlights problems such as bribery, weak regulatory enforcement, lack of transparency in some government contracts, and the influence of political connections on economic activity.The report states that the Kurdistan Regional Government’s Anti-Corruption Commission has investigated 72 senior officials in the region over five years on corruption charges. It also reported that from January to October 20, 2023, forty people in the region were convicted of corruption crimes. The report also reports that the commission’s activities have been disrupted due to political disagreements.

This data indicates serious concerns about corruption, financial transparency, and the way contracts are awarded in the Kurdistan Region, but the report does not publish the names of all those questioned and it is not possible to infer specific charges against key leaders of the Kurdistan Region or any other figures.

Overall, the published documents show that the history of the United States’ dealings with Kurdish movements and figures cannot be limited solely to sanctions or entry bans.This history ranges from denial of political meetings and restrictions on travel and residence to formal sanctions on certain organizations and their leaders, and in more recent cases, legal prosecution of financial claims related to government contracts.

However, no direct evidence was found in the public sources reviewed to prove that Massoud Barzani or Jalal Talabani personally faced a definitive ban on entry to the United States or a specific denial of visa applications. The documents on these two figures suggest more political considerations, limited access to American officials, and disagreements over Washington’s policy objectives in Iraq. In contrast, the documents on Mustafa Barzani provide more detail about the visa review and the conditions for his medical travel.This report is based on published official documents, declassified historical correspondence, federal regulations, U.S. Treasury and Justice Department announcements, official reports, and publicly available sources.